Organ Donation as National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ Donation Law by Fentiman, Linda C.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1993
Organ Donation as National Service: A Proposed
Federal Organ Donation Law
Linda C. Fentiman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, LFentiman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ Donation Law, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1593
(1993), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/327/..
ORGAN DONATION AS NATIONAL SERVICE: A 
PROPOSED FEDERAL ORGAN DONATION LAW* 
Linda C. Fentiman? 
America's organ transplantation system is in crisis. At a time when 
transplant survival rates are at an all-time high, with more than ninety 
percent of kidney transplant recipients alive two years after trans- 
plant,' the waiting list for organs grows longer every day. Today, 
there are more than 26,000 individuals on a waiting list to receive a 
kidney, more than 2,900 persons waiting for a heart transplant, and a 
total of 35,000 individuals waiting for one or more vital  organ^.^ Since 
1988, more than 10,000 people have died while on a waiting list, while 
thousands more never even made it to a list.3 
Twenty-five years from now, the tragedy of death due to the lack of 
an organ transplant may seem like ancient history. ArtScial organs 
and tissues, fetal tissue transplantation, gene insertion technology, irn- 
proved drug treatments, and xenografts may develop to the point that 
organ transplantation will no longer be the preferred treatment for 
many otherwise fatal illnesses. Alternatively, the scarcity of economic 
resources to provide for Americans' health may grow so severe that 
only the very wealthy will be able to afford organ transplantation or 
other expensive forms of medical care. 
But at the moment, we are at the point in history known as "mean- 
while."4 With organ transplantation holding out the only hope of sur- 
vival for many persons, and for many others, the only hope of a good 
quality of life, there is tremendous pressure on medical and govern- 
mental policymakers to reform the present organ transplantation sys- 
tem to be both more effective and more fair in saving lives.5 
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1. Telephone Interviews with Donna Johnston, Office Assistant, Corporate Communi- 
cations Department, United Network for Organ Sharing (Oct. 11, 1993 & Aug. 17, 1994). 
2. Telephone Interview with Donna Johnston, Office Assistant, Corporate Communi- 
cations Department, United Network for Organ Sharing (Aug. 17, 1994). 
3. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: INCREASED EFFORTS 
NEEDED TO BOOST SUPPLY AND ENSURE QUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS 2 (1993) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
4. United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547,555 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring) 
(noting in context of rape corroboration requirement that whatever the future may hold, 
rules need to be developed which fit the current situation). 
5. Although organ transplantation is initially expensive, prolonging someone's life 
through organ transplantation rather than through drugs or artificial organs is ultimately 
cost-effective. The cost of surgery and the first year of care for an average kidney trans- 
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Academics, physicians, and government officials writing from many 
perspectives have criticized the present organ transplantation system, 
both for failing to adequately tap the potential pool of transplantable 
organs and for failing to allocate the organs that are available on a 
more equitable basis6 
In April 1993, the General Accounting Office released a study that 
was highly critical of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), 
the private organization that coordinates transplantation s e ~ c e s  
across the country pursuant to a contract with the federal govern- 
ment.7 The report also criticized the Department of Health and 
Human Services for its failure to adequately oversee UNOS and to 
ensure that organs are allocated strictly on the basis of medical criteria 
and not on the fortuity of being on the right transplant center's list 
when an organ' becomes a~ailable.~ Critics, Congressman Henry Wax- 
man prominent among them, have noted that wealthy foreigners are 
somehow able to receive organs which are not available to American 
plant procedure is $80,000 (in 1990 dollars). Thereafter, the annual cost of maintaining a 
transplant recipient on immunosuppressive drugs drops to $7,000. In contrast, maintaining 
an individual on kidney dialysis, a much less successful, palliative technology, costs an aver- 
age of $33,000. These figures do not include the costs of unemployment while recovering 
from transplant surgery or while being maintained on dialysis. END STAGE RENAL DIS- 
EASE FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE FINANCING RESEARCH REPORT (1990). 
6. Recent changes in both the law and public attitudes toward seat belt use and drink- 
ing and driving, along with broad demographic trends, have combined to decrease the pool 
of available donors. Id. Current estimates of the number of potential donors range from 
approximately 5,000 to 29,000 per year, with a leading study suggesting that there may be 
no more than 6,900 to 10,700 such donors. Roger W. Evans et al., The Potential Supply of 
Organ Donors: An Assessment of the EfJiciency of Organ Procurement Effor6 in the 
United States, 267 JAMA 239, 241-42 (1992). During the period from 1986 to 1989, ap- 
proximately 4,000 persons' organs were donated for transplant. Id. For many years, pro- 
ponents of the system of voluntary organ donation have argued that all that is necessary 
for an adequate supply of transplantable organs is to educate the public and, to a lesser 
extent, health care professionals, about the need for organ donation. See Arthur L. 
Caplan, Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Apr.-May 1988, at 34, 35 (noting health care provider noncompliance with required con- 
sent laws has been a primary problem). Others, however, have argued that only a dramatic 
rethinking of our approach to organ procurement and allocation will provide a significant 
number of organs. E.g., Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 811 (1970); Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a 
Proposed Model Organ Draft Act. 68 B.U. L. REV. 681 (1988). 
7 .  See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 4-5 (charging that UNOS policies are inade- 
quately enforced due to their voluntary nature and a lack of adequate documentation); see 
also 42 U.S.C. 10 273-274 (1988) (authorizing Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
contract with private organization to coordinate transplant activities). 
8. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (summarizing findings that HHS inadequately 
monitors and evaluates activities of UNOS and organ procurement organizations). 
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citizens and permanent resident  alien^.^ In addition, a number of re- 
cent studies have documented significant disparities between the rate 
at which white and black Americans receive organs for transplant and 
the amount of time they must wait for transplant organs.1° In part, 
these disparities are attributable to unequal distribution of human leu- 
kocyte antigens (HLAs) among different racial groups. These anti- 
gens are what trigger a "rejection" response when the body rejects a 
"foreign" (i.e., not genetically identical) organ transplant, and histori- 
cally the extent of HLA matching, or the lack of mismatching, has 
been important in selecting the most suitable organ recipient.ll The 
difference in HLA tissue antigens in persons of various races has been 
offered to explain the disparity in transplantation statistics.12 How- 
ever, reliance on HLA tissue matching as a major factor in organ allo- 
cation has been challenged on both scientific and ethical grounds. 
In response to these and other concerns about the organ transplan- 
tation system, in the last Congress, the House of Representatives 
passed a bill requiring the Department of Health and Human Services 
to immediately promulgate regulations to replace the voluntary guide- 
lines which now govern UNOS and organ transplantation centers.13 
This law mandated the development of a single list of organ recipients 
for each organ procurement organization, with allocation to be made 
on the basis of strictly medical criteria.14 At the same time, American 
citizens and permanent resident aliens would receive absolute priority 
-- - - - 
9. Symposium, Law and Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, 
Public Policy, and the Law, 27 SUFFOLK U .  L. REV. 1457, 1560 (1993) (discussing legisla- 
tion regulating organ transplants). 
10. See e.g., Robert S. Gaston et al., Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The Dk- 
parate Impact of HLA-Based Allocation, 270 JAMA 1352, 1352 (1993) (reporting that 
blacks have highest incidence of chronic renal failure, yet receive fewer transplant organs); 
Fred P. Sanfilippo et al., Factors Affecting the Waiting Time of Cadaveric Kidney Transplant 
Candidates in the United States, 267 JAMA 247,247-52 (1992) (exploring factors that may 
contribute to longer waiting periods for African-American transplant candidates). In 1990, 
African-Americans, who represent 12% of the general population, represented 31% of 
Americans awaiting kidney transplant, yet they received only 22% of the cadaveric kidney 
transplants. Gaston, supra, at 1352. The average waiting time for such a transplant was 
nearly 14 months, while Caucasian Americans had a wait of less than eight months. Gas- 
ton, supra, at 1352. 
11. Ian Ayres, et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 V A N D E R ~ ~ T  
L. REV. 805, 808 n.9, 817-25 (1993). 
12. See Gaston, supra note 10, at 1355 (concluding alternatives to HLA-based alloca- 
tion must be developed to remedy racial disparities); cf: GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 24- 
26 (discussing UNOS criteria for organ transplantation and alternate selection criteria). 
13. See H.R. 2659, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 2 (1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. 
8 273(b)(3)(H)) (requiring organ procurement organizations to be members of UNOS and 
abide by its rules). 
14. Id (amending 42 U.S.C. 8 273(b)(3)(E)). 
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over foreign nationals in the allocation of organs for transplant.15 Fi- 
nally, the law would diversify the membership of UNOS and other 
organ provider organizations to include more "citizen," and less insti- 
tutional, representatives.16 The Senate also addressed these and other 
issues in a similar bill, sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy and 
others.17 
Yet even if these bills were to be reenacted by the new Congress, 
they would be insufficient to realize the promise of organ transplant 
technology for the thousands of Americans who die each year while 
awaiting a transplant. Since the late 1960s, when the development of 
immunosuppressive drugs made possible the receipt of an organ from 
a nongenetically related donor,18 academics and public policymakers 
have collaborated to develop mechanisms to encourage the donation 
of organs and tissues for transplant but have achieved only limited 
success. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (U.A.G.A.), first pro- 
posed in 1968, has been adopted by every state and the District of 
Columbia.lg The goal of the U.A.G.A. was to appeal to Americans' 
altruism and to make it easy to volunteer to donate one's organs and 
tissues, simply by signing a "donor card" (usually on obtaining a 
driver's license) declaring the individual's intent to donate his or her 
organs at the time of death.20 Yet despite the fact that sixty-two per- 
cent of Americans say they would like to donate their organs upon 
death, and that an even larger percentage indicate their willingness to 
donate the organs of a loved one:' donor cards and the U.A.G.A. 
have had only minimal impact on increasing the supply of organs and 
tissue for donation. Many Americans have not signed a donor card, 
or their card is not found at the time they are declared dead.22 
-- 
15. Id (amending 42 U.S.C. § 273). 
16. Id (amending 42 U.S.C. 5 273(b)(l)(G)). 
17. S. 1597, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). 
18. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a 
Fufures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.2 (1989) (tracing events that led to wide- 
spread availability of organ transplants). 
19. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT OF 1987, table of jurisdictions, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993); 
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT A m  OF 1968, table of jurisdictions, 81 U.L.A. 63 (1993). 
20. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT OF 1987 5 2,8A U.L.A. 34 (1993); UNIF. ANATOMI- 
CAL GIIT ACT OF 1968 § 4, 8A U.L.A. 109 (1993). 
21. See Evans, supra note 6, at 244-45 (noting surveys finding 45 to 50% willing to 
donate organs for transplant); Mimi Modarress, Organ Donation and Transportation: The 
Need for a Multipronged Approach for Equitable Avocation, 37 HOSP. & HEALTH SERV- 
ICES ADMIN. 549, 553 (1992) (noting Gallup polls in 1980s found 70 to 80% willing to 
donate organs for transplant); Daphne M. Sipes, Does It Matter Whether There Is Public 
Policy for Presumed Consent in Organ Transplantation?, 12 W ~ E R  L. EV. 505,506 n.6 
(1991) (reporting study finding 73% indicated willingness to donate loved one's organs). 
22. See Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, Reply to Letters to the Editor, 270 
JAMA 1930,1931 (1993) (noting many do not have driver's licenses and donor cards often 
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Whether this is due to people's psychological unwillingness to con- 
front their death in a concrete to procrastination, or simply 
to disorganized wallets, the fact remains that very few organ trans- 
plants occur solely on the basis of a donor card.24 Indeed, almost all 
American physicians and nurses refuse to go forward with retrieving 
organs for transplant without the consent of the dead donor's next of 
despite the U.A.G.A.'s explicit provisions protecting those who 
rely on a donor card from legal liability.26 At the same time, because 
many health care providers are reluctant to approach grieving families 
with a request for organ donation, many opportunities for organ dona- 
tion are lost.27 A number of factors have been offered to explain this 
reluctance, including a lack of education or cultural sensitivity on the 
part of health care workers, a concern about the appearance of over- 
reaching a bereaved family, fear of legal liability, and the health care 
professional's own discomfort with death.28 
In response to the organ shortage under a system of voluntary or- 
gan donation, in 1986 Congress enacted "Routine Inquiry" legislation, 
mandating that all hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid reim- 
bursement establish protocols pursuant to which all families of dead 
or dying potential organ donors will be asked to consider donating the 
organs of their loved one.29 Yet despite this law, and similar laws 
cannot be located at death); James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation Policy: A 
Time for Reassessment, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451,469 (1989) (acknowledging very few 
people sign donor cards); Modarress, supra note 21, at 553 (reporting only 15 to 19% of 
Americans have signed donor cards). 
23. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 8-11 (discussing psychological and religious implica- 
tions of organ donation). 
24. See Irwin Kleinman & Frederick H. Lowy, Cadoveric Organ Donation: Ethical 
Considerations for a New Approach, 141 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 107,108 (1989) (stating that 
surgeons regularly seek approval of donor's family despite presence of donor card). 
25. Id.; see also James F .  Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Pol- 
icy, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 5,17 (1989) (stating that it is customary to seek family 
approval rather than rely on donor card). 
26. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT OF 1987 5 ll(c), 8A U.L.A. 59 (1993) (providing 
immunity to persons who in good faith rely on donation authorization); accord UNIF. ANA- 
TOMICAL GIIT ACT OF 1968 5 7(~) ,  8A U.L.A. 124 (1993). 
27. See Caplan, supra note 6, at 35 (asserting that physician reluctance to approach 
families regarding organ donation is a primary obstacle). 
28. See Blumstein, supra note 22, at 468-69 (discussing the "potentially ghoulish char- 
acter" of approaching grieving family about organ donation); M.K. Gaedeke Noms, Re- 
quired Request: Why It Has Not Significantly Improved the Donor Shortage, 19 HEART & 
LUNG 685, 685-86 (1990) (urging education and training of health care workers with re- 
spect to requesting organ donation); Peter A. Singer, A Review of Public Policies to Pro- 
cure and Distribute Kidneys for Transplantation, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL m ~ .  523, 524 
(1990) (suggesting that fear of legal liability and the emotional demands of requesting do- 
nation make physicians reluctant to approach families). 
29. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1320b-8 (1988) (requiring participating hospitals to establish proto- 
col to ensure that families of potential donors are informed of donation option); accord 42 
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which have been enacted by more than thirty states,3O organ donation 
has remained static over the last several years, and in some localities, 
has actually de~lined.3~ 
Thus, it is time to consider an alternative approach to organ pro- 
curement and allocation-one that relies on presumed consent to or- 
gan donation, combined with incentives which recognize the 
communal basis of the obligation to donate one's organs after death. 
Such a system must provide numerous opportunities for "opting out" 
of donation in order to promote individual autonomy and use eco- 
nomic and eleemosynary3= incentives for persons to contribute their 
organs after death.33 Mere mention of the words "presumed consent" 
and "compensated donation" may raise ethical eyebrows. However, a 
system of presumed consent to compensated organ donation should 
be considered as a rational response to the present organ shortage. 
We must view organ donation as an act of community service, and 
support it in the way that we currently encourage service in a volun- 
teer military or the Peace Corps, with the provision of subsidized edu- 
cation, health, and other benefits to those who serve.34 
Under my proposed statute, all mentally competent individuals over 
the age of eighteen would be presumed to have consented to the re- 
trieval of their organs at the time of Medical personnel could 
C.F.R. f 482.12 (1993) (requiring written protocols to ensure identification of potential 
organ donors). 
30. See Singer, supra note 28, at 524 (noting widespread enactment of state legislation 
requiring donation request). 
31. See Singer, supra note 28, at 524 (stating that the organ supply in Oregon and Cali- 
fornia remained constant or decreased after legislation enacted); cf. Evans, supra note 6, at 
242 (noting that attempts to increase organ supply have had only modest success). 
32. These incentives include a provision that individual transplant centers may have 
"first crack" at the organs obtained from donors dying there, which is contrary to the pro- 
posal of House bill 2659. Model Statute § IV(A)(l). This provision makes it more likely 
that organs will be returned to the community from which they were obtained, potentially 
eliminating some of the racial disparities now apparent in organ allocation. The statute 
also provides for federal oversight of incentives offered to potential donors, through the 
establishment of the National Organ and lissue Research and Transplantation Board 
(NOTRTB), which would annually determine the maximum compensation permitted for 
the donation of an organ. Model Statute § III(B)(2)(a), (C)(l). 
33. The model statute also permits the parents of an anencephalic infant to donate 
their child's organs prior to death, recognizing anencephalic5 as a group of children who 
are sui generis. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (noting ethical debate over 
whether anencephalic infants should be permitted to be organ donors). 
34. See 38 U.S.C. $5 1710-1714 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (providing entitlement to edu- 
cational assistance for veterans' families and medical benefits for disabled veterans); id. 
$5 3481-3493 (providing education assistance to veterans). 
35. At least for the present, donation of minors' organs should not be presumed, in 
order to limit state intrusion at a time of parental grief. However, it is hoped that the 
national discussion on presumed consent to donation by adults would raise parental aware- 
ness of the possibility of donating a child's organs. A recent study of pediatric organ dona- 
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then begin the process of preparing a deceased individual's body for 
organ transplantation without waiting to find a donor card or the next 
of kin, which would enhance the viability of organs for transplant. 
Physicians would no longer need to confront a grieving family with the 
need to make a quick decision about organ donation, because that 
decision would be out of the family's hands. Concerns about a conflict 
of interest when an individual's organs are harvested for transplant to 
another patient at the same hospital would also be eliminated, be- 
cause agreement to transplant would already be presumed. 
The idea of a system of presumed consent is not new. It has been 
proposed by a variety of commentators over the last twenty-five 
years." It has also been adopted, in a variety of forms, in several 
European countries, notably Austria, Belgium, and the former Yugo- 
slavia, as well as Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, and Tbni~ia.~' In 
more than twenty states, a presumed consent system for the donation 
of specific organs, most often the cornea and the pituitary gland, has 
been adopted for cases in which the decedent's body is under the au- 
thority of the medical examiner or coroner.38 This has resulted in the 
tion at Vanderbilt University Medical Center found that 18 out of 19 families of children 
who were potential organ donors were asked to consider donating the child's organs. All 
18 families agreed to donate. John A. Moms, Jr., et al.,Pediatric Organ Do-x The 
Paradox of Organ Shortage Despite the Remarkable Willingness of Families to Donate, 89 
PEDIATRICS 411,413 (1992). Extrapolating these results to the 20,000 American children 
who die each year, the study's authors estimate that all present pediatric organ transplant 
needs could be satisfied severalfold. Id. 
36. See Dukeminier, supra note 6, at 837-42 (proposing legislation permitting organ 
removal unless donor previously objected). 
37. The New Zealand Human Tissue Act of 1964,9 3(2) (as amended 1989); L. Roels 
et a]., Three Years of Experience with a "Presumed Consent" Legislation in Belgium: Its 
Impact on Multi-Organ Donation in Comparison with Other European Countries, 23 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 903, 903-04 (1991); Sipes, supra note 21, at 515; Tunisia. Law 
No. 91-22 of 25 March 1991,42 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 449,449-50 (1991); Yugoslavicrr 
Decree No. 1266 of I8 October 1990,43 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 46,46-47 (1992). 
38. See ARK. CODE ANN. 9 12-12-320 (Michie 1987) (consent to remove pituitary gland 
presumed); CAL. GOV'T CODE 9 27491.46-47 (West 1988) (consent to remove pituitary 
gland and corneal eye tissue presumed); CAL. HEALTH & S A E ~  CODE 9 7151.5 (West 
Supp. 1991) (authorizing removal of organs if donor did not object and next of kin cannot 
be located); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 9 19a-281 (West 1986) (consent to remove pituitary 
gland and corneal tissue presumed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 9 4712 (1991) (consent to 
remove cornea presumed); D.C. CODE ANN. 9 2-1605 (Supp. 1988) (consent to remove 
corneal tissue and aortic and pulmonary heart valves presumed); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 732.9185 (West 1994) (consent to remove corneal tissue presumed); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-23-6 (Michie 1991) (consent to remove cornea presumed); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
8 311.187 (MichieIBobbs-Menl 1990) (consent to remove corneal tissue presumed); MD. 
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. 9 4-509.1 (1991) (consent to remove corneal tissue presumed); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 9 333.2855, .I0202 (West 1992) (consent to remove pituitary 
gland and cornea presumed); MINN. STAT. ANN. 99 390.36,525.9213 (West 1994) (any part 
may be removed if no known objection and next of kin cannot be located); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. 9 58.770 (Vernon 1989) (consent to remove pituitary gland presumed); MONT. CODE 
HelnOnllne - -  27 Suffolk U L Rev 1599 1993 
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restoration of sight to more than one-half million people, with only 
infrequent  challenge^.^^ 
Yet proposals for presumed consent to organ donation could be at- 
tacked as "un-American," unsuited to a nation in which respect for 
individual autonomy and self-determination are at the pinnacle of the 
collective value system, and in which appeals to fears of creeping Big 
Brotherhood are often successful. Thus, it is important to explain why 
this proposal for presumed compensated organ donation meets objec- 
tions based on autonomy, and how it can be seen as an appropriate 
community response to a community tragedy-the death of those 
whose lives could have been saved through the donation of organs 
from a person no longer living. 
The first challenge that could be raised is that this statute would 
eliminate the opportunity for individual choice about whether to do- 
nate organs. Yet in fact, the statute I propose provides six separate 
occasions on which an objection to organ donation could be made. 
These are: when obtaining or renewing a driver's license; on filing an 
income tax return; when applying for welfare disability or other gov- 
ernmental benefits; on every visit to a hospital or doctor's office, when 
a health care provider explicitly requests a patient to consider donat- 
ing her organs, and when executing a living will or health care proxy 
document.40 Each person's objections to presumed donation would 
be recorded in a national computerized registry, which would be up- 
dated on a daily basis, and would be protected by appropriate back-up 
systems to prevent losing any  objection^.^^ Some religious, civic, and 
civil liberties groups would undoubtedly react to the enactment of this 
ANN. 72-17-215 (1993) (any part may be removed if no known objection and next of kin 
cannot be contacted); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 291-A:7-b (1993) (consent to remove cor- 
nea presumed); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4222 (Consol. 1987) (consent to remove corneal 
tissue and pituitary gland presumed); N.C. GEN. STAT. 8 130A-391 (1993) (consent to re- 
move corneal tissue presumed); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2108.53, .60 (Anderson 1994) 
(consent to remove pituitary gland and corneal tissue presumed); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, $5 944.1,2210.1 (West 1994) (consent to remove pituitary gland and corneal tissue pre- 
sumed); TENN. CODE ANN. 9 68-30-204, -301 (1992) (consent to remove cornea and pitui- 
tary gland presumed); TEX. HEALTH &  SAFE^ CODE ANN. 693.002 to .004 (West 1994) 
(any organs may be removed if no known objection and next of kin cannot be located); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 5 693.012 to .013 (West 1994) (consent to remove 
corneal tissue presumed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 8 510 (Supp. 1993) (consent to remove 
pituitary gland presumed); W. VA. CODE 16-19-3a (1991) (consent to remove cornea 
presumed). 
39. See Emile J. Farge et a]., The Impact of State Legislation on Eye Banking, 112 
ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOGY 180,183 (1994) (reporting that states' limited presumed con- 
sent laws have led to a dramatic increase in corneal transplant donations); infra note 63 
(noting litigation challenging presumed consent procedures). 
40. Model Statute 8 III(C)(2). 
41. Model Statute 8 III(C)(6). 
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proposed legislation by urging their members to opt out of the pre- 
sumed consent system, thus promoting free and open debate and edu- 
cation about the propriety of organ donation. Because every citizen 
would have the ability to choose not to participate in the presumed 
consent system, respect for individual dignity and autonomy would be 
ensured. 
Others might object that permitting compensation of any kind for 
the donation of organs and tissues is dehumanizing and that the pro- 
posed statute provides unseemly incentives for the poor to lose the 
last vestiges of their humanity through the violation of their corpse. 
But one must recognize that our society already grants the poor nu- 
merous opportunities to compromise their humanity and to risk their 
health based on monetary concerns. Among the examples which leap 
to mind are prostitution and other selling of their labor at relatively 
high wages in high-risk, low-prestige jobs, the poor's lesser ability to 
buy safer cars than the wealthy, and poor adults' inability to afford 
comprehensive health insurance for themselves and their families. 
Further, under the current organ transplantation system, everyone 
profits except the organ donors: the transplant surgeons receive ego 
gratification, prestige, and money for their labor on the transplant 
team; the transplant center and its workers gain both an enhanced 
reputation and income; the nonprofit organ procurement organization 
maintains its raison d'eae - the business of organ procurement and 
allocation; and, of course, the organ recipient receives the gift of life 
itself. It is, frankly, hard to understand why even the offer of compen- 
sation for the donation of an organ will suddenly transform the vast 
American organ transplantation enterprise from an exalted and altru- 
istic endeavor into a tawdry and venal business deal, the medical 
equivalent of haggling with a street vendor.42 
In addition, if a poor (or a wealthy) person might choose to donate 
his or her organs after death in exchange for a decent burial, payment 
for medical treatment prior to death, priority in receiving an organ 
42. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120,160,793 P.2d 479,506 (1990) 
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting the majority's refusal to recognize a 
cause of action for conversion when a patient's organ is removed and used as the basis for 
lucrative commercial medical research); 51 Cal. 3d at 165, 793 P.2d at 509-10 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the concept of property, as a "bundle of rights," ought to be 
construed broadly to include the power to receive valuable consideration for certain uses 
of one's discarded organs). Indeed, a survey sponsored by UNOS found that 52% of the 
Americans surveyed supported the use of nonfinancial compensation for organ donation. 
A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Explor- 
ing the Altemrives, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 117, 124-25 (1993). 
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transplant should the donor need one,43 a college tuition voucher for 
his or her children or grandchildren, or a gift to a favorite charity, it 
would be parentalistic interference of the worst sort to deny the donor 
the ability to make that rational trade-off. Since the National Organ 
and Tissue Research and Transplantation Board would establish maxi- 
mum, uniform compensation for organ donation, all persons would be 
treated equally, both in deciding to opt "in" or "out" of the presumed 
consent system and in their receipt of compensation for the gift of life. 
Finally, this statute achieves important communital goals because 
the statute treats organs and tissues as community resources, which 
are made available to medically appropriate candidates within that 
community. The statute states a preference that organs be offered 
first to a recipient from the donor's community.44 While allocation of 
scarce resources such as organs should generally be made in accord- 
ance with medical, not social, criteria, a blind insistence on absolute 
medical equitf5 will cause other important goals to be overlooked, 
including increasing the organ supply by providing incentives to do- 
nate.46 Thus, for example, to the extent that young, urban African- 
Americans or other persons of color are likely to suffer an accidental 
or violent death and become a potential organ donor, a system of pre- 
sumed consent, compensated donation, and preference for local use of 
organs will make more organs available to those communities which 
are presently not receiving an appropriate share. 
The proposed model statute recognizes that organ donation is a 
powerful act of virtue. By relying on presumed consent and compen- 
sated donation and by giving a preference to local organ recipients, 
the model statute encourages persons to act on their altruistic im- 
pulses and makes it possible to save more lives through organ 
donation. 
43. See Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 24, at 109-10 (proposing incentive program that 
assures donors priority in the event that they need transplant in future). 
44. Model Statute 8 IV(A)(l). 'Ihis is contrary to current UNOS guidelines and rejects 
the GAO Report's recommendation that organs be allocated pursuant to a single list based 
solely on medical criteria, drawn from a wider geographical area. GAO REPORT, supra 
note 3, 5-6. 
45. Indeed, it is impossible to reach consensus on just what "strictly medical" criteria 
should be used, or on the weight each criterion should be accorded. Gaston,supra note 10, 
at 1354. 
46. Wayne B. Amason, Directed Donation: The Relevance of Race, =SIWGS CENTER 
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 13, 17-18 (proposing consideration of recipient's race to alleviate 
discrimination resulting from HLA-based allocation of kidneys); Gaston, supra note 10, at 
1354-55 (analyzing current HLA-based allocation of kidneys which results in dispropor- 
tionate number of transplants to Caucasians). 
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MODEL ORGAN AND TISSUE 
TRANSPLANTATION STATUTE 
Preamble ....................................................... 
Section I: Definitions ........................................ 
Section 11: Unified Federal Authority Over Organs and 
Tissues for Transplant and Research .............. 
Section 111: Increasing the Supply of Organs .................. 
.......................... A. Organ Harvestibility 
B. Provisions Relating to the Free Alienation of 
Homo Sapiens Organs and Tissues ........... 
C. Presumed Compensated Donation. ........... 
Section N: Ensuring More Equitable Allocation of Organs 
....................................... and IIissues 
A. The Principle of Geographic Priority: All 
Organs Shall Be Allocated First to the 
Community Where They Were Obtained.. ... 
B. Criteria for Receiving an Organ or nssue for 
Transplant .................................... 
Section V: Protection of the Public from the Transmission of 
Infectious Diseases Through Transplant.. ......... 
Section VI: Payment for Transplant ........................... 
The Congress of the United States hereby declares that there is a 
crisis in the provision of organ and tissue transplants to those Ameri- 
cans who will die without an organ or tissue transplant. The Congress 
further finds that there is a concomitant crisis in the lack of organs and 
tissues available to research the causes of a number of diseases which 
lead to premature death. These two crises consist of the following 
interrelated problems: 
(1) a lack of sufficient organs and tissues to meet the demand for 
transplantation and research, 
(2) an inequitable allocation of the existing supply of organs and 
tissues, 
(3) inadequate protection of the interests of organ and tissue do- 
nors and donees in making an informed and autonomous decision, 
and 
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(4) inconsistent treatment of different organs, tissues, and organ 
and tissue systems under current federal and state law and private 
contract. 
In order to remedy these inadequacies the United States Congress 
hereby enacts the following statute. 
The following terms have the meanings indicated: 
(1) "Cell line" means a culture of cells derived from a human body 
and developed through recombinant DNA technology that is capable 
of reproducing indefinitely and exists apart from a human body. 
(2) "Competent" means legally competent to will property in ac- 
cordance with the law of testamentary capacity of a particular 
jurisdiction. 
(3) "Individual" means any member of the species homo sapiens. 
(4) "Organ" means any organ, tissue, organ group, or tissue group 
of the species homo sapiens. 
(5) "Organ provider organization" (OPO) is an organization that 
provides administrative and logistical support for the transplantation 
of organs within a locality or region. 
SEC~ION 11: UNIFIED FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER ORGANS AND 
TISSUES FOR TRANSPLANT AND RESEARCH 
All organs and tissues retrieved in the United States, whether they 
are to be used for transplantation or research, shall be retrieved and 
allocated in accordance with uniform federal laws.47 There is hereby 
established the National Organ and 'Iissue Research and Transplanta- 
tion Board (NOTRTB), an independent federal agency under the au- 
thority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Board 
shall have authority to promulgate regulations to govern all aspects of 
organ and tissue procurement and distribution, in accordance with the 
mandate of this 
47. This statute seeks to provide a uniform federal legal structure for organ and tissue 
transplantation and research, while simultaneously meeting the goals of federalism. Thus, 
to the extent that particular aspects of organ and tissue transplantation or research raise 
issues similar to those created by medical or surgical procedures, they should be treated 
comparably under applicable state or local law. See Model Statute 8 III(B)(l)(b) (con- 
cerning application of state law to the issue of informed consent to participation in organ 
transplantation and research); Model Statute 8 III(C)(2)(e), (5) (relating to use of living 
wills, durable powers of attorney for health care, and health care proxies to elect not to 
donate). 
48. It is the goal of this statute to eliminate duplicative and inconsistent federal regula- 
tion and oversight of a variety of organ and tissue products. For example, organ and tissue 
products, including cell lines, which are "genetically engineered" through the use of recom- 
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A. Organ Harvestibility 
(1) Any individual may be a candidate for the removal of his or her 
organs or tissues, if any one of the following criteria is met: 
(a) the individual has sustained irreversible cessation of circulatory 
and respiratory functi0ns,4~ or 
(b) the individual has sustained irreversible cessation of all func- 
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,5O or 
(c) the individual was born with all or a portion of his or her brain 
absent.51 
(2) A determination of whether one of the enumerated criteria has 
been met must be made according to accepted medical practice, by 
persons who are not part of any transplant or research team that 
would benefit, either directly or indirectly, from the use of harvested 
organs or tissues. 
B. Provisions Relating to the Free Alienation of Homo Sapiens 
Organs and Tissue 
(1) All competent individuals over the age of eighteen may donate 
any or all of their non-gametes2 organs or tissues whose presence in 
the body of any individual is not necessary to sustain his or her 
binant DNA technology, shall all be regulated under the authority of this statute and by 
the National Organ and Tissue Transplantation and Research Board. Such products shall 
no longer be regulated as biological products or medical devices under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act or the Public Health Services Act. 
49. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH A m  $1,  12 U.L.A. 386 (Supp. 1993). 
50. Id. Thirty-one jurisdictions have adopted the "brain death" definition of death 
used in the Uniform Determination of Death Act. A number of other states have achieved 
the same result through either another statute or judicial decision. 
51. This would permit anencephalic infants to be organ and tissue donors. 
The model statute supports the idea that parents should be able to donate the organs of 
an anencephalic child, even though such a donation would accelerate the child's inevitable 
death. Because such children are "born dying" and can feel no pain, and because of the 
severe shortage of pediatric and newborn organs, it is believed that parental privacy and 
autonomy should be respected in this narrowly defined class of donors. But see Committee 
on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Infants with Anencephaly as Organ 
Sources: Ethical Considerations, 89 PEDIATRICS 1116,1118-19 (1992) (opposing organ do- 
nation from anencephalic infants with brain stem function). This statute proposes that 
parents of anencephalic infants be permitted to donate the infants' organs and tissues. 
52. This statute does not preclude the donation or sale of homo sapiens' gametes. 
Rather, the issue of whether such actions are appropriate is treated as outside the statute's 
scope. The extraction and use of fetal tissue is addressed in Professor Steven Hicks' article, 
The Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Different Legislative Models for Different 
Purposes, 27 SUFFOLK U .  L. REV. 1613 (1993). 
53. Whether or not a particular organ or tissue is necessary to sustain human life will 
change as medicine and medical technology evolve. Currently, for example, one may sur- 
Heinonline - -  27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1605 1993 
1606 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:1593 
subject to conditions set forth in section (3). All competent individu- 
als over the age of eighteen may donate any or all of their non-gamete 
organs whose presence in the body of the individual is necessary to 
sustain his or her life. However, such donation may not be effectuated 
until after the individual's organs are capable of being harvested, pur- 
suant to section III(A), supra.54 
(2). Donation of organs shall be subject to the following provisions: 
(a) If the donation of the organ or tissue is to be ~ornpensated,~~ 
the compensation provided may be no greater than the maximum per- 
mitted by the National Organ and Tissue Research and Transplanta- 
tion Board (NOTRTB);56 
(b) The individual shall be informed of the risks and benefits of the 
medical procedures necessary to remove the organ or tissue from his 
or her body as required by the applicable tort law57 of his or her juris- 
diction and the provisions of this statute;58 
(c) Prior to any organ or tissue being donated, the institutional re- 
view board (IRB) of the institution at which the removal will take 
place shall review the protocol under which the organ or tissue is be- 
ing removed and determine that all ethical and legal requirements 
have been met; 
vive with only one kidney and with a portion of one's liver. Additionally, a person may 
survive after donating a replenishable bodily tissue, such as blood or bone marrow. 
54. This section makes possible the formation of an executory contract to donate or- 
gans post-mortem. 
55. To the extent that donors would be permitted to receive an economic benefit for 
their donation, that portion of the National Organ Transplant Act which criminalizes the 
sale of human organs must be repealed. See 42 U.S.C. 1274.e (1988) (criminalizing any 
transfer of transplant organs in exchange for valuable consideration). Many state codes 
have similar provisions prohibiting the sale of organs for transplant. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. 
1 16-12-160 (Michie 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. 1 327-10 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. 1 26-28- 
10 (Supp. 1993). 
56. The Board will annually establish the maximum compensation to be awarded for 
any bodily organ or tissue or group of organs or tissues. The maximum compensation may 
be calculated either as a dollar amount, or as the provision of certain defined services (such 
as the payment of the donor's burial or medical expenses), as the provision of a college 
tuition voucher, a tax-deductible gift to a charity chosen by the donor, or as a percentage of 
the profits to be derived from the commercial exploitation of the individual's tissues. But 
see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120,141-43,793 P.2d 479,497 (1990) 
(holding that a patient did not have a cause of action for conversion, permitting recovery of 
profits from the commercial exploitation of cell line derived from his spleen). 
57. This includes both the common law and statutory law of torts. 
58. This subsection, and the ones that follow, endeavor to meet the need for special 
vigilance to protect the interests of both donors and recipients which the law of informed 
consent generally seeks to protect. While, under this statute, organ procurement and allo- 
cation would take place in accordance with uniform federal procedures, the statute also 
acknowledges that organ and tissue transplantation and research are also a form of medical 
practice and technology, which should, insofar as possible, be governed by state law. 
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(d) The National Organ and Tissue Research and Transplantation 
Board will establish, through notice and comment rule-making under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, general ethical and legal require- 
ments to ensure that informed consent has been obtained from all per- 
sons donating their organs or tissues, that there is sufficient scientific 
merit to a particular transplantation or research protocol to just@ the 
risks involved to both the donor and recipient of the organ or tissue, 
and that no overreaching or undue pressure has been applied to either 
the donor or recipient of the organ or tissue; 
(e) The National Organ and Tissue Research and Transplantation 
Board will promulgate regulations governing the review of particular 
research or transplant protocols which each institutional review board 
shall 
(f) The National Organ and Tissue Research and Transplantation 
Board shall annually publish a regulation in the Federal Register list- 
ing transplantation procedures which it deems so experimental as to 
not justify reimbursement by any third-party payor under the Ameri- 
can Health Security Act.60 
C. Presumed Compensated Donation 
(1) All competent individuals over the age of eighteen who have 
not opted out of the organ donation system, in the manner prescribed 
below, shall be presumed to have agreed to donate any needed organs 
or tissues and shall be offered by the organ recipient the amount of 
compensation established by the National Organ and 13ssue Research 
Transplantation B ~ a r d . ~ '  
- 
59. These regulations might be patterned on current Department of Health and 
Human Services rules governing institutional review board (IRB) oversight of human sub- 
ject experimentation if it is determined that these regulations are effective in protecting 
vulnerable human subjects. See 45 C.F.R. 5 46.109 (1993) (requiring IRB review of re- 
search protocols to ensure compliance with regulations). 
60. The statute is written with the expectation that in the next several years there will 
be significant health care reform, at both the federal and state level. The Board would, for 
example, review autologous bone marrow transplants, to determine their efficacy and ap- 
propriateness for treatment of particular forms of cancer. 
61. The presumed agreement to make a compensated donation has two goals. First 
and foremost, it recognizes the reality that the goals of a transplantation and research 
system based on the ideal of voluntary organ and tissue donation have not been realized 
and that the ever increasing success of organ and tissue transplantation has not been 
matched by an adequate supply of organs and tissues. See supra notes 21-31 and accompa- 
nying text (discussing failure of "required request" and "routine inquiry" legislation to 
fulfill current organ transplant needs). 
Second, faced with the static number of potential organ and tissue donors, a number of 
institutions and commentators have suggested extreme measures to expand the pool of 
potential donors. One institution has developed a mechanism to orchestrate the manner 
and moment of dying in a way that enhances the number of persons who can be declared 
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(2) All competent individuals over the age of eighteen shall be pro- 
vided the opportunity not to donate their organs or tissues, on all of 
the following occasions: 
(a) when they file their annual federal income tax return, 
(b) when they receive or renew a license to operate a motor 
vehicle, 
(c) when they apply for benefits under Aid to Families with Depen- 
dent Children and other living assistance programs, including unem- 
ployment compensation and disability benefits, 
(d) when they enter a hospital or physician's office for any treat- 
ment or procedure, 
(e) when a health care professional specifically proposes to procure 
one or more of their organs or tissues, and 
(f) when executing a living will or health care proxy document, as 
provided in (5) below. 
(3) On each of these occasions, all competent individuals over the 
age of eighteen years shall be given the opportunity to elect what form 
of compensation, if any, they wish to receive if their organs are given 
for transplant. 
"brain dead" in a hospital setting, permitting their organs to be quickly harvested. See 
Michael A. DeVita & James V. Snyder, Development of the University of Pittsburgh Medi- 
cal Center Policy for the Care of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors 
After Death Following the Removal of Life Support, 3 KENNEDY IN=. ETHICS J. 131, 136- 
41 (1993) (discussing protocol developed to permit organ harvesting immediately after 
withdrawal of life support). But see Alan A. Weisbard, A Polemic on Principles: Reflec- 
tions on the Pittsburgh Protocol, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 217,223-25 (1993); and Renee 
C. Fox, "An Ignoble Form of Cannibaliwn": Reflections on the Pittsburgh Protocol for Pro- 
curing Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers, 3 KENNEDY IN=. ETHICS J. 231,233-34 
(1993) (criticizing the rush to avoid tissue damage due to warm ischemia at any cost). 
Others have suggested that the criteria for the harvesting of organs should be redefined to 
include persons in a persistent vegetative state and anencephalic newborns. Each of these 
proposals has a number of detractors. It is ultimately a moral question as to whether it is 
appropriate to drastically alter conventional notions of death and dying in order to in- 
crease the supply of organs and tissues. It is a political question as to whether public 
enthusiasm for organ donation is so strong that people will be willing to support such 
radical redefinitions of life and death. 
The proposal to permit people to agree to donate their organs in exchange for some 
form of compensation is not new. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 2 (proposing to permit 
persons to contract for sale of their organs, to be harvested after death); Kleinman & 
Lowy, supra note 24, at 133-34 (concluding that compensation and organ markets are most 
preferable alternatives to the current donation system). However, despite the objections 
of many commentators to reliance on market forces to achieve a greater supply of organs 
and tissues, the fact remains that appeals to altruistic instincts to assist our fellow human 
beings have not been successful, and there are a number of psychological and organiza- 
tional barriers to the successful recruitment of voluntary donors. A system of presumptive 
compensated donation would eliminate many of these hurdles, while still respecting the 
value of individual autonomy, by providing people with numerous opportunities to opt out 
of the system. 
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(4) The individuals may indicate that they: 
(a) do not wish to donate any organs, or 
(b) do not wish to donate specific organs. 
(5) Any individual may declare, in a writing that meets the require- 
ments of the laws of his or her jurisdiction relating to living wills, natu- 
ral death, health care proxies, or durable power of attorney for health 
care, that he or she does not wish to donate any organ or tissue at a 
time when he or she meets the criteria for organ harvestibility. 
(6) The names and addresses of all persons who have objected to 
becoming an organ donor, under all or limited circumstances, shall be 
maintained in the National Organ Availability Registry (NOAR), a 
computerized registry which shall be maintained on a nationwide and 
statewide basis, updated daily:* and made available to qualified 
health care personnel and employees of state and/or local medical ex- 
aminers' offices and funeral homes. This registry shall be maintained 
in strict compliance with all applicable state and federal statutes gov- 
erning patient privacy and confidentiality. 
(7) Unless an individual has opted out, as described above, he or 
she will be conclusively presumed to have agreed to divest himself or 
herself of all medically needed and suitable organs at the moment that 
he or she meets the criteria of organ harvestibility. 
(8) No relative or friend of the individual may object to his or her 
becoming an organ or tissue donor under these circumstances. 
(9) No physician, health care provider, medical examiner, or fu- 
neral home employee shall be held civilly or criminally liable for the 
removal of any or all suitable organs and/or tissues if he or she checks 
the National Organ Availability Registry and finds no record of objec- 
tion to donation by the individual and has no other notice of the indi- 
vidual's objection.63 
62. This daily updating mechanism ensures that not only will competent individuals be 
able to "opt out" of organ sale or  donation whenever they choose, but also that individuals 
who previously opted out may, at any time, change their minds and opt in. This could 
readily happen if a dying or ill individual was faced with an explicit request to donate, or if 
an individual, confronted with the possibility of the death of a loved one, is asked to donate 
an organ to that person. In both of these cases, the law of informed consent and the rigor- 
ous procedures adopted by the National Organ and Tssue Research and Transplantation 
Board will operate to  ensure that no overreaching of vulnerable potential donors and sell- 
ers occurs. See Model Statute § III(B), supra; cf: Arthur Caplan, Am I My Brother's 
Keeper?, 27 SUFFOLK U .  L. REV. 1195 (1993) (discussing potential for overreaching both 
biologically-related and emotionally-related living donors). 
63. IIhis provision is aimed at  eliminating lawsuits such as those that have arisen chal- 
lenging actions under state presumed consent laws. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 
477, 482 (6th Ci. 1991) (allowing suit against coroner who donated corneas of decedent 
where spouse had refused donation at hospital); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188,1191 (Fla. 
1986) (holding statute providing presumed consent for corneal transplant constitutional); 
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SECTION IV: ENSURING MORE EQUITABLE ALLOCATION F 
ORGANS AND TISSUES 
A. The Principle of Geographic Priority: All Organs Shall Be 
Allocated First to the Community Where They Were 
Obtained 
(1) All organs and tissues obtained for transplantation and research 
shall be offered first to the transplant or research centeP that is most 
closely associated with the locus of obtaining the organ or tissue.65 
Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye and Human Parts Bank, Inc., 136 Misc. 2d 1065, 1067, 519 
N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (complaint alleging hospital donated decedent's eyes 
without ascertaining whether person who gave consent was decedent's spouse); Callsen v. 
Cheltenham York Nursing Home, 154 Pa. Commw. 541,544,624 A.2d 663,665 (1993) (suit 
against funeral home and hospital for failing to locate decedent's family to obtain permis- 
sion to donate body). 
64. Organs and tissues shall be allocated for research or transplant on the basis of a 
ratio to be determined by the Federal Organ and Tissue Research and Transplantation 
Board. The Board shall annually determine, through notice and comment rulemaking 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the appropriate percentage for each organ and 
tissue category that shall be allocated to the needs of research or transplantation. No indi- 
vidual or health care provider or institution shall be able to appeal from or otherwise 
challenge the allocation decisions of the Board. 
65. This requirement is a change from current transplantation practice. Under the re- 
cently amended definition of "local unit" used by the United Network for Organ Sharing, 
"the [Llocal unit will be the organ provider organization in most cases" and "[tlhere should 
be a single waiting list for each organ within each local unit." United Network for Organ 
Sharing Rule No. 3.1.7. This definition of "local unit" was designed to ensure a more 
equitable allocation of available organs and tissues, in response to criticism expressed in 
the April 1993 GAO Report. 
This definition, however, will have a number of undesirable consequences. first, organs 
that are procured in one locale within the jurisdiction of an Organ Provider Organization 
may have to be transported hundreds of miles to another, distant locale within that OPO, 
reducing the likelihood of successful transplant because the viability of organs deteriorates 
rapidly over a 24 hour period. Thus, the goal of more "equitable" organ distribution may 
be achieved at the price of reducing the total number of lives saved through 
transplantation. 
Second, both human nature and the economic and prestige interests of individual trans- 
plant centers may lead to a situation in which organs are not procured as aggressively as 
possible if health care personnel of a particular hospital know that the organ they seek to 
harvest will not be used to meet the needs of a local patient. This may be so despite the 
requirement under this statute's presumed consent framework that the organs of all poten- 
tial donors who have not opted out be taken for transplantation or research. 
Third, under current practice, many recipients are on the waiting list of more than one 
transplant center-a practice which has been found to frequently shorten the time that a 
patient waits for an organ transplant. Sanfilippo, supra note 10, at 250. To the extent that 
wealthier and better educated donors are more often on multiple waiting lists, the United 
Network for Organ Sharing rule perpetuates the discriminatory impact of our current two- 
tier health care system. 
Finally, the communital underpinnings of the proposed statute require that, where possi- 
ble, locally procured organs be returned to the community in which the donor lived. This 
approach responds to the frequently voiced concern that persons of color are under- 
represented in the organ recipient population, despite being overrepresented in the donor 
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(2) If there is no suitable local organ or tissue recipient who meets 
the criteria of section B, infra, the organ or tissue shall be offered to 
the closest regional Organ Provider Organi~ation.~~ 
(3) If there is no suitable local or regional organ or tissue recipient 
who meets the criteria of section B, infra, the organ or tissue shall be 
offered to the national registry of potential organ recipients. 
B. . Criteria for Receiving an Organ or Tissue for Transplant 
Medical suitability, and American citizenship or legal resident alien 
status shall be the sole criteria for the receipt of an organ or tissue. 
Compliance and social worth criteria shall not be used in the alloca- 
tion of organs or tissues for transplant. 
(1) Medical suitability criteria for organ or tissue receipt shall be 
determined by the National Organ and Tissue Research and Trans- 
plantation Board, which shall annually publish a list of eligibility crite- 
ria for each organ, tissue, or organ group. These criteria must be 
applied by all transplant professionals in reviewing the suitability of 
particular potential organ  recipient^.^^ 
(2) No more than ten percent of all organ or tissue transplants per- 
formed at an individual transplant center shall be performed on per- 
sons who are not citizens of the United States of America or legal 
resident aliens thereof.68 In addition, no more than ten percent of the 
population because they are disproportionately likely to be the victims of accidents and 
violent crime. See supra notes 10-12 & 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing racial 
disparities of the current allocation system). 
66. Currently, OPOs are certified by a private entity, the United Network for Organ 
Sharing, if they meet its requirements. The GAO Report sharply criticized the Depart- 
ment of Health and Human Services' lax oversight of UNOS and the lack of meaningful 
federal authority over OPOs and transplant centers. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; see 
also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of current approach to 
organ donation). The model statute envisions that in the future such certification will oc- 
cur under the direct authority of the federal government. 
67. The GAO recently emphasized the need for federal government articulation of 
medical criteria for the selection of recipients for organ or tissue transplantation. GAO 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 5. 
68. Alternatively, if problems under the North American Free Trade Agreement are 
foreseen, this section could read, "No more than ten percent of all organ or tissue trans- 
plants performed at an individual transplant center shall be performed on persons who are 
not citizens of North America." 
Although the limitation on the transplantation of "American" organs and tissues into 
"non-American" bodies might appear to be niggardly, if not xenophobic, it represents a 
logical extension of the communital philosophy underlying this statute-that individual 
organs and tissues are a community resource and can be drafted for the national good, 
subject to the opting-out provisions of section III(C), supra. On a practical level, this pro- 
vision will minimize concerns that wealthy foreigners who need transplant surgery will 
come to the United States and contribute large sums of money to major teaching hospitals 
that also operate transplant centers. 
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organs and tissues donated may be obtained from individuals who are 
not American citizens or legal resident aliens of the United States of 
A ~ n e r i c a . ~ ~  
A. The National Organ Transplant and Research Board shall pro- 
mulgate regulations to ensure that no person who receives an organ or 
tissue or product thereof, either directly or indirectly, shall be infected 
with any disease present in the original organ or tissue.70 
B. All health care providers, either individuals or institutions, who 
comply with these regulations shall have a complete defense to any 
suit brought: 
(1) as the result of any organ or tissue recipient developing an in- 
fectious disease due to that receipt, or 
(2) out of fear that one might develop an infectious disease due to 
the transplant. 
SECI-ION VI: PAYMENT FOR TRANSPLANTATION 
A. All organ and tissue transplantation procedures shall be paid 
for in accordance with the Guaranteed National Benefits Package 
Plan of the American Health Security Act provided that: 
(1) they are deemed medically necessary and appropriate by the 
recipient's physician, and 
(2) they are deemed non-experimental by the regulations of the 
National Organ and Xssue Research and Transplantation Board.71 
B. Such payments shall include all necessary immunosuppressive 
drugs and other treatment modalities and procedures necessary to en- 
sure the long-term success of the transplant. 
69. At the same time, the 10% limitation on non-American donors anticipates con- 
cerns that poor, especially Third World, individuals would be lured to the United States by 
the prospect of being paid for their vital organs. 
70. A similar proposal was contained in the Human Tissue for 'Tfansplantation Act of 
1993 proposed by United States Representative Ron Wyden, to guarantee the safety of 
banked human tissue. H.R. 3547, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
71. See Model Statute 9 III(B)(4), supra (directing the Board to publish a list of proce- 
dures deemed too experimental to merit reimbursement). 
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